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BREARD, PRINTZ, AND THE 
TREATY POWER 
CARLOS MANuEL VAzQUEZ* 
Virginia's execution of Angel Breard last year, with the 
blessing of the United States Supreme Court1 but in the teeth 
of an order of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")2 and a 
request of the United States Secretary of State,3 raised a 
number of important questions concerning the distribution of 
powers and responsibilities among the state and federal 
governments in the area of foreign affairs.4 This article· 
addresses an issue that could have been raised in the Breard 
litigation but was not: whether the treaty provision Virginia 
violated contravenes the anticommandeering principle 
articulated in Printz v. United States5 and New York v. United 
States.6 If the treaty provision did attempt to commandeer 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to 
David Bederman, Curtis Bradley, Viet Dinh, Vicki Jackson, and Mark Tushnet for 
comments on an earlier version, and to Matthew Hsu for research assistance. 
1. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (per curiam); see also 
Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1016 (1999); Stewart v. 
LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. 1018 (1999). 
2. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. 
v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. No. 99 (Apr. 9), reprinted in 37 I.LM. 810, 819 (1998), 
available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlipaus/ipausframe.htm>; see 
also Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. 
U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. No. 103 (Mar. 3, 1999), available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/ich www/idocketligus/igusframe.htm>. 
3. See Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James 
S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998), quoted in Jonathan I. 
Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard, The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 
671-72 (1998). 
4. I have addressed some of these issues elsewhere. See Carlos Manuel 
Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of 
Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683 (1998) [hereinafter Vazquez, Breard 
and the Federal Power]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, 
Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in 
Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Vazquez, Night 
and Day]. 
5. 521 u.s. 898 (1997). 
6. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). It is unclear why this issue was not raised in the 
Breard litigation. Although Printz was decided after the Breard litigation 
commenced, see Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 
134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 
(1998); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 
134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 
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Virginia's officials within the meaning of those cases, the 
question arises whether the anticommandeering principle 
applies to exercises of the treaty power as well as exercises of 
the legislative power. Some commentators have suggested that 
the rule of Printz and New York is not applicable to the treaty 
power, 7 but others disagree. 8 
Angel Breard, a national of Paraguay, challenged his 
sentence on the ground that Virginia had violated the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (''Vienna Convention" or 
"Convention"),9 a treaty to which the United States and 
Paraguay are both parties. The Vienna Convention provides in 
pertinent part that a national of one country "arrested or 
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or ... detained 
in any other manner" by the authorities of another country 
has the right to confer with the consul of his country, if he 
so requests, and that "said authorities shall inform the 
person concerned without delay of his rights under this 
[provision]."10 The treaty thus required the Virginia 
authorities who arrested Breard to inform him that he had a 
right to consult with his consul, something Virginia did not do. 
This provision appears prima facie to commandeer state 
officers in contravention of Printz. 11 
A closer examination, however, reveals that the question 
whether the Vienna Convention's consular notification 
(1998), the anticommandeering principle as articulated in New York at least 
arguably prohibited federal commandeering of state executive officials. Perhaps 
Virginia's lawyers concluded that Printz did not apply to exercises of the treaty 
power or that the Vienna Convention did not "commandeer" in violation of New 
York and Printz. Perhaps they overlooked the argument. 
7. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 33, 52 (1997); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1260 (1995). 
8. See, e.g., Curtis A Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 409 (1998); James A Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for 
Foreign Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on International Treaties that Place 
Affirmative Obligations on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United 
States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997 (1998). See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 467 n.75 (2d ed. 1996) (New 
York limits "presumably" apply to exercises of the treaty power). 
9. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 
596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
10. Id. art. 36(1). 
11. See Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? 
Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726, 1746 (1998). 
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provision commandeers is quite complex. The complexity 
results from two ambiguities in the Court's anticommandeering 
doctrine. First, the Court in New York and Printz 
distinguished laws that commandeer from laws that merely 
"encourage," and it made clear that the latter are not barred. 
There is some question, however, where the line between 
commandeering and encouragement falls. Second, the Court in 
New York and Printz did not call into question Congress's 
power to preempt state law, yet the decisions leave uncertain 
where the line falls between unconstitutional commandeering 
and valid preemption. 
Determining whether the Vienna Convention's consular 
notification provision commandeers requires an examination of 
both of these ambiguities. One of the categories of laws the 
Court in New York found to be valid. "encouragement" consists 
of laws that "conditionally preempt" state law-that is, laws 
that give the states a choice between agreeing to do something 
that would otherwise constitute commandeering and 
submitting to a valid federal law preempting state law.12 The 
consular notification provision could be viewed as valid 
conditional preemption on the theory that it gives the states a 
choice between giving aliens the notification contemplated by 
the Convention and refraining from arresting nationals of 
countries that are parties to the Convention. The provision 
would constitute valid conditional preemption, however, only if 
a law or treaty barring states from arresting such persons 
would be valid. In light of Missouri v. Holland, 13 a treaty 
barring the arrest of nationals of certain countries would not 
violate any subject-matter limitation on the treaty power 
deriving from the Tenth Amendment, as the Court in that case 
held that there were no such limitations. There is some basis, 
however, for concluding that such a treaty would violate the 
anticommandeering principle itself. 
The answer to the broader question addressed by this 
article-whether the anticommandeering principle applies to 
the treaty power-similarly depends on the resolution of the 
two ambiguities identified above. If commandeering were 
defined broadly, as distinguished from both· encouragement 
and preemption, then the anticommandeering principle could 
12. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68. 
13. 252 u.s. 416 (1920). 
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not plausibly be considered applicable to exercises of the treaty 
power, as it would condemn numerous treaties that the 
Supreme Court has upheld. The broad interpretation of this 
principle, however, seems implausible even in the nontreaty 
context. On the other hand, applying a narrower 
interpretation of the anti commandeering principle to the treaty 
power would pose no special problems, and in some respects 
has considerable appeal. 
Part I of this article explains why a federal law requiring 
state officers to provide a notification to private parties under 
certain circumstances appears prima facie to violate the anti-
commandeering principle, but suggests that the Vienna 
Convent~on's consular notification provision may be valid 
conditional preemption because it leaves the states the option 
of refraining from arresting the relevant aliens. My analysis of 
conditional preemption, however, exposes this technique as a 
cheap and easy way for the federal government to evade the 
anticommandeering principle. For example, the statute 
invalidated in Printz itself could be upheld as conditional 
preemption with only seemingly trivial modifications. Part I 
considers possible constraints on Congress's use of conditional 
preemption in the purely domestic, nontreaty context, but 
concludes that the constraints are weak. 
Part II explains that conditional preemption is even less of 
a constraint on the federal government in the treaty context 
because, under Missouri v. Holland, there are no subject-
matter limits on the treaty power having their source in the 
Tenth Amendment. Thus, even if the anticommandeering 
principle applied to exercises of the treaty power, Congress 
would retain an even broader capacity than in· the non treaty 
context to "encourage" states by threatening preemption. Part 
II considers and rejects various proposals to limit the 
substantive scope of the treaty power in the name of state 
sovereignty. 
In both the treaty and nontreaty contexts, the breadth of 
the conditional preemption doctrine depends on where the line 
falls between invalid commandeering and valid preemption. 
For example, the consular notification provision is valid 
conditional preemption only if a hypothetical treaty barring the 
arrest of aliens would be valid preemption. Part III examines 
the plausibility of broad interpretations of Printz and New York 
adopted by two federal courts of appeals, either of which would 
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condemn such a hypothetical treaty. The Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits have read those decisions to bar federal laws that 
impose regulations on states without imposing the same 
regulations on private individuals/4 the Seventh Circuit has 
read them to bar federal regulations that regulate the states 
"in their role as governments."15 Applying either of those 
interpretations to the treaty power would be highly prob-
lematic. Like the Constitution, but unlike statutes, treaties 
typically govern "state action." When the United States 
accepts an obligation by treaty, therefore, the obligation 
typically applies to the actions of the federal and state 
governments, but not to private conduct. The broad interp-
retations of the anticommandeering principle adopted by these 
courts would therefore represent a serious limitation on the 
treaty power. They also conflict with a number of Supreme 
Court decisions upholding treaties and statutes that would be 
invalid under those interpretations. I conclude that those 
broad interpretations of Printz, implausible even outside the 
treaty context, in any event should not apply to exercises of the 
treaty power. 
In Part IV, I argue that there is little reason for exempting 
the treaty power from the anticommandeering principle if that 
principle were understood narrowly to encompass only the sort 
of directives involved in the Printz and New York cases. In 
light of the limitations and exceptions recognized in New York 
and Printz, the federal government retains significant options 
short of commandeering for inducing action by state officials 
where state officials are better situated than federal officials to 
do what the treaty contemplates. Perhaps ironically, one of the 
effects of applying the anticommandeering principle to the 
treaty power would be to call into question an "understanding'' 
the United States has attached to recent human rights treaties, 
purportedly in the interest of state sovereignty. This sort of 
irony, however, pervades the Supreme Court's doctrine in this 
area. In my view, the fact that it calls these understandings 
into question gives considerable appeal to applying the narrow 
14. See Pryor v. Reno, No. 98-6261, 1999 WL 187050 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 
1999); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, Mar. 
15, 1999 (No. 98-1464). 
15. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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interpretation of the anticommandeering principle to exercises 
of the treaty power. 
I. COMMANDEERING VS. ENCOURAGEMENT 
A. What It Would Mean to Invalidate the Consular 
·Notification Provision Under Printz 
When Angel Breard challenged his death sentence on the 
ground that Virginia officials failed to notify him of his right to 
consult with his consul, Virginia responded by arguing, among 
other things, that Breard had forfeited this claim by failing to 
raise it at trial and that vacatur of a conviction is not a remedy 
authorized by the Convention.16 The State did not argue, 
however, that the obligation to notify Breard of his right to 
consult with his consul was an unconstitutional 
commandeering of state officials by the federal government. At 
the time Virginia first responded to Breard's Vienna 
Convention claims, Virginia officials may not have understood 
that the Constitution prohibited commandeering of state 
executive officials, 17 but the Supreme Court in Printz 
subsequently made it clear that it does. The Court in Printz 
also made it clear that the Constitution prohibits 
commandeering even if the burden on the states, financial or 
otherwise, is de minimis .18 If the issue were to arise again, 
therefore, the validity of the consular notification provision 
could legitimately be raised.19 
16. See Vazquez, Night and Day, supra note 4, at 52-53. 
17. See supra note 6. 
18. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 931-33 (1997). 
19. In Breard, and later in Stewart v. LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. 1018 (1999), the 
Court denied relief on the ground that the alien invoking the Vienna Convention 
had forfeited his claim by failing to raise it at the appropriate time. The Printz 
issue would be squarely raised, however, if an alien denied the required 
notification were to raise the issue at the proper time and satisfy other threshold 
requirements. Cf United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, No. 98-50347, 1999 WL 
160848 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 1999) (finding that, upon a showing of prejudice, 
violation by federal officials of Vienna Convention right to consular notification 
can constitute ground for suppressing statements subsequently given). 
The Vienna Convention is not the only treaty that purports to impose 
obligations on state officials of this nature. For example, the Convention on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons provides that "[a]ny sentenced person to whom this 
Convention may apply shall be informed by the sentencing State of the substance 
of this Convention." Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, art. 4(1), 35 U.S.T. 2868, 2872, 22 I.L.M. 530, 531. 
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1323 1999
1999] PRINTZ AND THE TREATY POWER 1323 
Invalidating as unconstitutional commandeering the 
requirement that state officials notify arrestees of their right to 
consult with their consuls would in no way diminish the United 
States' responsibility towards other parties under international 
law. Printz would simply mean that, as a matter of domestic 
law, state officials could not be required to provide the 
notification. The result would be that the federal government 
would have to provide the necessary notification when state 
authorities arrested nationals of other states-parties to the 
Vienna Convention. This would of course raise significant 
practical difficulties for the federal government, not the least of 
which would be to learn of the states' arrests of foreign 
nationals. But the Court in Printz made it clear that federal 
commandeering of state officials is invalid even if such 
commandeering is clearly a more efficient means of 
accomplishing the desired end than direct federal 
enforcement. 20 
The survival of the international obligation to notify 
arrestees of their right to consult with their consuls,21 however, 
20. The Court in Printz did leave open the possibility that a federal law 
requiring state officials to report certain information to the federal government 
might not violate the anticommandeering principle. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 
n.l7; id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Because there does not seem to be a 
principled distinction between this sort of obligation and others that clearly 
violate Printz, some commentators have questioned this possible exception. See 
Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 
SUP. CT. REV. 199, 234-35. Without this exception, the federal government would 
have a difficult time learning of the arrest of aliens triggering the consular 
notification right. If the exception were recognized, on the other hand, the states 
could not be obligated to provide the. notification to the arrestee, but they could be 
required to notify the federal government of the arrest, permitting the latter in 
turn to provide the notification to the arrestee-certainly a highly inefficient 
result. 
21. The Vienna Convention clearly contemplates that the notification be 
given by the "authorities" who detained the alien. But if the Constitution 
prohibits the imposition of that obligation on state executive officials, then surely 
notification by federal officials would be preferable, from the point of view of the 
treaty, than no notification at all. Indeed, it is likely that the parties to the treaty 
were indifferent as to who does the notifying, as treaties do not generally address 
the allocation of responsibilities among particular domestic authorities. The 
language of the treaty no doubt reflects a recognition of the practical difficulties of 
requiring notification by anyone other than the arresting authorities, rather than 
a preference for notification by state as opposed to federal officials. But if these 
practical difficulties could be overcome, surely no one would complain if the 
notification were given by someone other than the arresting authorities. In other 
words, the requirement that the notification be given is severable from the 
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suggests another basis for upholding the requirement that 
state officials provide the notification. The Convention could, 
in theory, be satisfied even if neither state nor federal officials 
ever notified any alien of a right to consult with his consul. 
The Convention requires such notification only if such an alien 
is "detained"; if no alien is detained, no notification is required. 
Thus, a federal law prohibiting states from detaining aliens 
from countries that are parties to the Vienna Convention 
would, if valid, ensure compliance with the Convention. The 
federal government has not passed such a law, but Congress's 
power to pass such a law is relevant to the validity of the treaty 
provision the federal government did enact. The remainder of 
this part explains the relevance to our analysis of a 
congressional power to ban altogether the arrests of aliens by 
state officials. Parts II and III then consider whether the 
federal government in fact possesses such a power. 
B. The Consular Notification Provision as Conditional 
Preemption 
In New York u. United States, the Court struck down only 
one of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The Court held that Congress 
could not compel or coerce the states into enacting or 
administering a federal regulatory scheme, but it upheld two 
provisions giving the states "incentives" short of compulsion. 
First, it upheld a provision offering the states money in 
exchange for their agreement to administer the federal 
regulatory scheme,22 deeming s~ch an offer mere 
"encouragement."23 Second, and more importantly for present 
purposes, it upheld a provision giving the states a choice 
between administering the federal regulatory scheme and 
having state law preempted by a valid federal law.24 On the 
requirement that it be given by the arresting authority, and thus the former 
would survive if the latter were to fall. 
22. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173 (1992). 
23. ld. 
24. See id. at 174. 
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other hand, the Court struck down the so-called take-title 
provision, which transfe~ed title to certain radioactive waste 
to the state if the state failed to administer the federal 
regulatory scheme.25 This provision, the Court held, gave the 
states a choice between two options Congress could not 
constitutionally have imposed separately.26 Both options, the 
Court said, constituted unconstitutional commandeering of 
state officials.27 The take-title provision accordingly, "crossed 
the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion."28 
New York thus leaves the federal government the option of 
inducing states to provide the required notification by offering 
them money or threatening to withdraw money they are 
already receiving. This sort of encouragement could be quite 
effective, but it would still leave open the possibility that states 
would refuse to comply and thus produce a treaty violation. 
The second set of incentives suggests a more effective strategy. 
Since the treaty would be complied with if no nationals of 
states-parties were arrested by the states, if Congress lacked 
the power directly to compel the states to provide the required 
notification, it could enact a law prohibiting the states from 
arresting persons who are nationals of such countries. If such 
a law would be constitutional, then the New York Court's 
reasons for upholding the second incentive suggest that 
Congress could also give the states a choice between not 
arresting such persons and arresting them but giving them the 
required notification. Just as the second incentive in New York 
was a valid "conditional exercise" of Congress's commerce 
25. See id. at 177. 
26. See id. at 175. 
27. See id. 
28. Id. The Court's apparent conclusion that a forced transfer of title to 
waste is itself a violation of the anticommandeering principle has implications for 
the scope of this principle. See infra text accompanying note 95. Alternatively, 
one might view the Court's holding with respect to this provision as resting on the 
idea that the transfer of title is a penalty for the states' refusal to administer the 
federal regulatory scheme, and that it was by attaching a penalty to this refusal 
that Congress had "crossed the line" distinguishing encouragement from coercion. 
This would be consistent with the Court's practice in the Spending Clause area of 
regarding the payment of federal funds as "encouragement" (and the threatened 
withdrawal of such funds as merely the withdrawal of encouragement), while 
regarding the threat of even a minor fine as coercion. See also infra note 37; infra 
text accompanying notes 135-36. 
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power, such a law would appear to be a valid "conditional 
exercise" of the treaty power.29 
Indeed, enactment of a law giving the states the choice 
between not arresting aliens and arresting but notifying aliens 
would appear to be unnecessary, as the Vienna Convention 
itself, properly read, gives the states precisely that choice. As 
already noted, the treaty does not impose an unconditional 
obligation to notify aliens of anything; rather, it requires that 
aliens be notified of their right to consult with their consuls 
only if such aliens are detained. By its very terms, therefore, 
the treaty imposes a conditional obligation of the sort the New 
York decision appears to permit.30 
29. Perhaps the validity of such a statute would depend on the feasibility of 
requiring the federal government to provide the necessary notification. If the 
federal government could provide the notification without much difficulty, then 
one might say that a law prohibiting the states from arresting aliens is invalid as 
an exercise of the treaty power because it is not sufficiently tailored to achieving 
the legitimate end of securing compliance with the treaty. Assuming this sort of 
limitation exists, it is easily met in the case of the Vienna Convention, as it is 
infeasible for the federal government to provide the necessary notification when 
state authorities arrest an alien. I note, moreover, that this sort of limitation 
brings in through the back door an issue the Court in Printz regarded as 
irrelevant-that is, the degree to which requiring the state officials to perform the 
acts instead of federal officials would be easier or more efficient. 
30. Another of the limitations of the anticommandeering principle 
recognized in Printz and New York is that it prohibits only the commandeering of 
nonjudicial state officers. This suggests another way for Congress to secure state 
compliance with the consular notification provision: Congress could pass a law 
requiring state judges to provide nationals of states-parties the required 
notification and, if the notification had not previously been given and if the 
defendant so requests, to stay the prosecution to give the defendant adequate time 
to consult with his consul. Query whether the Court would strike down this 
obligation because it requires state judges to perform an executive function. The 
Printz decision suggests the Court would not strike the statute down, as the Court 
distinguished early statutes imposing seemingly executive obligations on the 
states on the ground that the obligations were imposed on state judges rather 
than executive officers. On the other hand, the Constitution's failure to define 
state "judges" or offer a basis for distinguishing them from state executive 
officials, cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (defining federal judges as those having life 
tenure and salary protection), appears to require that this exemption from the 
anticommandeering principle turn on the nature of the activity required by 
federal law. This is indeed the approach the Court has taken in the converse 
situation. See Printz v United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928-29 (1997) (distinguishing 
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), on the ground that the obligations the 
federal statute imposed on state executive officials were adjudicatory in nature). 
Alternatively, Congress might pass a statute requiring state judges to dismiss 
indictments of nationals of states-parties unless the defendant had previously 
been advised of his right to confer with his consul. Such a statute seems to me 
more vulnerable than the one described above, since it more directly imposes the 
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It might be objected that, if this analysis were correct, 
Printz should have come out the other way. At issue in Printz 
was the constitutionality of an interim provision of the Brady 
Act requiring the "chief law enforcement officer" ("CLEO") of a 
prospective gun purchaser's residence to conduct a background 
check of the prospective gun purchaser.31 The statute required 
gun sellers to obtain certain information about the prospective 
gun buyer and to provide that information to the CLE0.32 It 
also required the gun seller to wait five days before selling the 
gun, and it prohibited him from selling the gun if the CLEO, 
after performing the background check, informed him that the 
prospective gun buyer was ineligible to buy it.33 Could this 
scheme be characterized as an exercise of conditional 
preemption? By the terms of the statute, the obligation to 
perform the background check was triggered by, and 
conditioned on, an individual's request to purchase a gun, and 
surely it is within Congress's commerce power to ban entirely 
the sale of guns. 34 
To be sure, Congress could have achieved its goals by 
writing the Brady Act in such a way as to fit it wi~hin the 
obligation to notify on state executive officials. The instruction to state judges to 
dismiss indictments seems like a penalty for the state officials' failure to comply 
with this obligation. The hypothetical statute described in the preceding 
paragraph, on the other hand, would impose the notification requirement on state 
judges. It should, however, "encourage" state executive officials who do not want 
their prosecutions delayed to provide the required notification at an earlier stage. 
Both of the foregoing statutes could be conceived as additional examples of 
conditional preemption: they give the states the choice between providing the 
notification and having their prosecutions either stayed or dismissed by a state 
judge. Indeed, the consular notification provision as it currently stands, properly 
construed, may offer state executive officials precisely that choice. See United 
States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, No. 98-50347, 1999 WL 160848 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 
1999). I regard the characterization of the consular notification provision offered 
in the text, however, as a less controversial exercise of conditional preemption 
than (at least) the second of the hypothetical statutes discussed in this footnote. 
31. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-03. 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. Such a ban would appear to be within the commerce power, as 
interpreted in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Under the standard 
adopted in that case, Congress apparently may regulate anything that qualifies as 
"commerce," and certainly the sale of guns does. I discuss this issue further 
below. Of course, such a ban would be valid only if the Second Amendment does 
not limit Congress's power to impose it. Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937-39 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (suggesting the Brady Act violated the Second Amendment). 
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conditional preemption doctrine. A statute written along the 
following lines should have survived scrutiny: 
No gun shall be sold unless and until the prospective gun 
seller provides the CLEO [certain information about the 
prospective purchaser] and, within X days, the CLEO, 
having conducted a background check according to [specified 
standards], notifies the gun seller that the prospective 
purchaser satisfies [specified requirements]. Any gun seller 
who sells a gun without complying with this law shall be 
subject to [specified sanctions]. 
Such a statute would not have unconditionally required state 
officers to conduct background checks; it would merely have 
provided that, unless they did, no gun could be sold. If a 
federal ban on gun sales would be valid, this statute should 
also be valid, as it merely offers state officers a choice between 
conducting the background check and having their laws 
permitting the sale of guns preempted by an otherwise valid 
federal statute. 
But the Brady Act did not merely give the officers such a 
choice. As the Printz majority noted, the statute imposed 
certain penalties on state officials who refused to perform 
background checks.35 In light of these penalties, the statute 
could not be construed as merely giving the state officials a 
choice between administering the federal regulatory scheme 
and having their law preempted.36 Printz thus does not 
35. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904. 
36. The statute did give the officers a choice between providing the 
notification and paying a fine, but this choice is no more valid than the choice 
between enforcing federal law and taking title to waste. Indeed, in both Printz 
and New York, it may have been the existence of the sanction that rendered the 
statute invalid, making it "coercion" and thus "commandeering" rather than mere 
"encouragement." See infra note 37. But cf infra text accompanying notes 135-
36. The distinction between an invalid penalty and valid encouragement, 
however, is not always straightforward. For example, as discussed supra note 30, 
a law that requires state judges to dismiss indictments against an alien unless the 
alien was provided the notification required by the Vienna Convention might be 
said to impose a penalty for the failure to provide the notification. Like a fine, the 
dismissal is triggered by the failure to provide the notification and is designed to 
induce state executive officials to provide the notification. On the other hand, 
every exercise of conditional preemption could be said to have the same 
characteristics. New York requires that both options be valid if imposed 
independently, and this appears to require that each option be defined without 
reference to the other. In examining the validity of an exercise of conditional 
preemption, therefore, the question must be whether the law (the one setting 
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undermine the argument outlined above for fitting the consular 
notification proVIsion within New York's rationale for 
upholding the second incentive. 37 
C. Possible Constraints on the Use of Conditional 
Preemption 
My rewrite of the Brady Act suggests that, even in the 
purely domestic, nontreaty context, conditional preemption is a 
relatively cheap and easy way around the anticommandeering 
principle. While the federal government may not directly 
require state officials to conduct background checks, it can 
make the performance of a background check a condition of the 
forth the consequences of refusing to enforce the federal directive) would be valid 
if applied to all members of the relevant class, not just those who refuse to enforce 
the federal directive. Thus, in New York, the Court asked whether a law 
requiring all states to take title to waste would be valid. A law imposing a fine on 
CLEOs who refuse to perform a background check would be valid as conditional 
preemption only if a law requiring all CLEOs (and only CLEOs) to pay money to 
the federal government (in the amount of the fine) would be valid. Printz 
implicitly holds that it would not be. In examining the constitutionality of a 
statute requiring the dismissal of indictments of aliens who do not receive the 
notification required by the Vienna Convention, the relevant question would 
appear to be whether a law requiring the dismissal of indictments of all aliens 
would be valid. If so, then this hypothetical statute may in fact pose effectively 
the same choice as a statute giving state officials the choice between giving the 
notification and refraining from arresting aliens. If this is the analysis called for 
by New York and Printz, then whether a statute "coerces" (that is, imposes a 
sanction or penalty) or merely "encourages" turns on whether the other option 
would be independently constitutional, rather than on the degree or intensity of 
the inducing (or penalizing) it does. 
37. If the presence of a personal sanction is ultimately what doomed the 
Brady Act, then one might legitimately wonder why the Court did not just strike 
down the penalty provision. Cf. Evan Caminker, State Sovereignty and 
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal 
Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1057 (1995). But cf. infra text accompanying note 
135 (suggesting that absence of a sanction may not be sufficient to save a statute). 
On the other hand, one might interpret the Printz decision as having done just 
that: without the penalty provision, the requirement that state officials conduct 
background checks arguably becomes merely a request that they do so, and the 
Court made it clear in Printz that the federal government may request the 
assistance of state officials. See in particular Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion, 521 U.S. at 936, making it clear that, even after Printz, state officials 
remain free to conduct the background checks voluntarily. In any event, even if 
the Vienna Convention were interpreted to impose a penalty on state officials who 
arrest aliens without notifying them of their right to consult with their consuls (or 
if section 1983 imposes a penalty on such officials), the provision should be upheld 
because it gives the officials the third option of refraining from arresting aliens. 
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states' continued ability to do something it wants to do, such as 
permit the sale of guns in its territory. Commentators argue 
that there are significant doctrinal, economic, and political 
constraints on ·the . federal government's ability to use 
conditional preemption to evade the anticommandeering 
principle. The rewritten Brady Act, however, suggests that, in 
certain contexts at least, the constraints are quite weak. 
The constitutional limitations on the federal government's 
legislative powers are obvious constraints on its ability to 
evade Printz through conditional preemption. Conditional 
preemption allows the federal government to "encourage" 
states by giving them a choice between doing what they do not 
want to do and being barred from doing something they do 
want to do. The federal government thus extracts the states' 
"voluntary'' consent by threatening them with preemption 
through a law they would consider more onerous. But the more 
onerous law has to be one that, if enacted separately, would 
itself pass constitutional muster. 
This does not appear to be a significant constraint, 
however, even in the purely domestic, nontreaty context. (As 
discussed below, it may be even less of a constraint in the 
treaty context.) My conclusion that the hypothetical rewrite of 
the Brady Act would be valid rests on the premise that a flat 
ban on the sale of guns would be within the commerce power as 
construed in United States v. Lopez.38 Before Lopez, it had 
widely been thought that the federal government's legislative 
power under the Commerce Clause was, as a practical matter 
at least, all but plenary. 39 Though Lopez showed that there 
were some limits, even after Lopez, the commerce power 
remains broad.40 The precise ways in which Lopez modified 
prior doctrine are a matter of some uncertainty,41 but at any 
rate it appears that the teeth the Court gave to the 
constitutional limits in this area have bite only where the 
subject matter regulated by the federal government is not 
"economic" or "commercial."42 When the federal government 
38. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
39. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 674-
75 (1995). 
40. See id. at 712. 
41. See generally id. 
42. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion states the test thus: "Where 
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating 
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1331 1999
1999] PRINTZ AND THE TREATY POWER 1331 
regulates commercial or economic actiVity, the regulation 
should be no more vulnerable after Lopez than before. If so, 
then a federal statute banning the sale of guns would be valid, 
as the sale of guns is quintessentially a commercial activity.43 
To the extent I have misread Lopez, of course, my 
conclusions about the validity of a flat ban on gun sales could 
be contested. If the test of whether an act of Congress falls 
within the commerce power turned on the legitimacy of 
Congress's purposes in enacting it,44 or on the true need for 
federal legislation,45 the constitutionality of the hypothetical 
rewrite of the Brady Act would be uncertain. The rewrite 
would be valid as conditional preemption only if a flat ban on 
gun sales, enacted separately, would be valid. But Congress 
did not actually enact such a ban. How does one determine the 
"purpose" of a hypothetical statute? Does one try to imagine a 
hypothetical purpose that would be valid? A hypothetical 
purpose test would have no bite. If one focuses on the statute 
Congress actually enacted, on the other hand, the ban on gun 
sales would be suspect under a purpose test, as Congress's 
purpose in enacting it was at least in part to induce the states 
that activity will be. sustained." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. The Court's innovation in 
Lopez was to insert the term "economic" before "activity." Elsewhere, the majority 
described the test as requiring "the determination whether an intrastate activity 
is commercial or noncommercial." Id. at 566. Justice Kennedy's concurring 
opinion appears to treat the "commercial-ness" of the activity as a factor in a 
sliding scale: the more commercial the activity regulated by a federal statute, the 
more likely the statute is to be upheld as an exercise of the commerce power, 
other factors being equal (the principal other factor being the extent to which the 
activity has traditionally been regulated by the states). See id. at 569 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
43. See Merritt, supra note 39, at 719 ("Congressional regulation of the sale 
or 'transfer' of machineguns after Lopez is uncontroversial; the sale of any article 
is commercial activity."). Like Professor Merritt and all the Justices in Printz 
except Justice Thomas, see supra note 34, I shall disregard possible Second 
Amendment objections. Such objections would of course be irrelevant to statutes 
or treaties addressing other matters. 
44. Cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Adjudication, 
85 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1997) (noting. and approving increased use of purpose 
scrutiny in other areas of constitutional law). 
45. Professor Merritt has suggested that the Court's decision to strike down 
the federal law in Lopez was influenced by "[t]he Government's failure to identify 
an urgent national need to combat [the] problem" ostensibly addressed by the 
statute Congress passed. Merritt, supra note 39, at 705. Professor Jackson has 
proposed that the Court's current approach to federalism issues be replaced by a 
sort of "necessity" review. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and 
Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2234-37 (1998). 
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to do something they could not be compelled to do directly. The 
Court in New York, however, upheld the second incentive even 
while recognizing that it was designed to "encourage" the 
states to do what they could not be compelled to do,46 a purpose 
reflected in the very term "incentive." 
A flat ban on gun sales would be similarly suspect under a 
"need" test, as Congress's purposes could plainly have been 
achieved through less intrusive means. But the flat ban on 
guns was necessary precisely because Congress lacked the 
power to compel the background checks directly, no matter how 
great the need. An exercise of conditional preemption clearly 
cannot be invalid just because Congress's goals could be 
achieved less intrusively by constitutionally unavailable 
means. Conditional preemption by its very nature relies on the 
conditional imposition of a regime that Congress itself regards 
as a second-best solution in order to induce states to adopt 
voluntarily what Congress regards as the best solution. 
Applying a "need" test in this context raises a number of 
difficult questions.47 Indeed, the difficulty, if not the 
impossibility, of applying either a purpose test or need test to 
an exercise of conditional preemption supports my conclusion 
that Lopez does not embrace such a test. If the Court were to 
embrace such a test in the future, it would have to rethink the 
concept of conditional preemption. 
If the Commerce Clause does not pose much of a doctrinal 
limit to Congress's ability to employ conditional preemption, 
are there other sorts of constraints? Professors Michael Dorf 
and Charles Sabel,48 and Professor Roderick Hills,49 have 
suggested that economic considerations constrain Congress's 
46. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152 (1992). 
4 7. For example, does the court ask whether federal officials could plausibly 
perform the background checks instead? Such an analysis conflicts with the 
approach of the Printz Court, which regarded such a question as irrelevant. See 
supra note 29. Does a "need" analysis inquire whether the preemption chosen by 
Congress to induce the states' voluntary agreement was narrowly tailored to 
achieve that result? Such an inquiry would require the Court to devise a test for 
determining how much inducement is too much-a daunting task, to say the least. 
48. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. 1. REV. 267, 425-26 (1998). 
49. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 
MICH. 1. REV. 813, 868 (1998). 
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ability to engage in conditional preemption;50 Specifically, they 
note that a threat of preemption is credible only if Congress 
stands ready to devote federal resources to regulate a given 
matter itself in the event the states decline to do so. But, while 
this constraint may be significant in certain contexts, it 
appears to be negligible in others, as illustrated by my 
hypothetical rewrite of the Brady Act. The actual Brady Act 
imposed an obligation on state officials to perform background 
checks and subjected those officials to penalties for 
noncompliance. The rewrite encourages the state officials to 
perform background checks by prohibiting private parties from 
selling guns unless background checks have been performed by 
such officials, and it subjects the gun sellers to penalties for 
noncompliance. It is far from evident that achieving a given 
level of compliance would cost the federal government more 
under the latter scheme than under the former. Moreover, 
Congress could devise alternative enforcement schemes that 
would appear to be even less costly. For example, Congress 
could ban the sale of guns in any state in which the legislature 
has not enacted a law imposing severe state-enforced penalties 
on state officers who do not conduct background checks.51 
Congress could even rely on private attorneys general to 
enforce the ban on guns through qui tam actions; the portion of 
the fine retained by the federal government under such a 
scheme would offset any increased cost, which would in any 
event be minimal or nonexistent under this scheme. Of course, 
if the qui tam actions were maintained in federal courts, there 
would be a cost allocable to the federal judiciary. But even this 
cost could be minimized by giving exclusive jurisdiction to the 
state courts, a sort of commandeering permitted by Printz.52 In 
short, Congress could dev1se inexpensive yet credible second-
50. See also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemption and 
Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 289, 312 
(1984). 
51. ,Such a scheme should be easier for the federal government to enforce, as 
gun shops would be altogether illegal in easily identifiable states. Alternatively, 
or in addition, Congress could subject gun sellers who sell to people who have not 
undergone a state-performed background check to damage liability to persons 
injured by the guns they sell. 
52. Under such a scheme, the cost allocable to the federal judiciary would 
consist only of the resources expended by the Supreme Court in reviewing 
certiorari petitions and deciding the few, if any, cases involving this statute that 
the Court chooses to decide. 
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best schemes that could be quite effective at inducing states to 
agree to enforce Congress's preferred scheme.53 
Hills also suggests that conditional preemption can be 
"politically costly."54 He does not describe political costs other 
than the economic ones discussed above, but perhaps he or 
others would say that there is likely to be substantially greater 
political opposition to a flat ban on gun sales than to a law 
requiring a five-day waiting period and a background check. 
That is surely true, but the hypothetical rewrite of the Brady 
Act does not flatly ·ban gun sales; it gives the states the choice 
of performing background checks or having gun sales banned. 
Because the rewritten statute does not require anything more 
objectionable than a background check (if a background check 
is regarded as the less objectionable option), a rational 
constituent should be no more disposed to object to this statute 
than to a statute that only requires background checks (and 
that is the statute Congress in fact enacted). Admittedly, a 
conditional ban on gun sales could disproportionately arouse 
the gun lobby or give it the opportunity to mischaracterize a 
legislator's vote in television commercials as a vote for a flat 
ban. On the other hand, it should be possible to write a 
conditional preemption statute in such a way as to make it 
clear that Congress is not requiring-and does not prefer-the 
more objectionable option. The rewritten Brady Act, for 
example, merely provides that sales of guns shall be subject to 
a five-day waiting period and a background check performed by 
state officials. The only differences between the rewrite and 
the actual Brady Act are that the penalty under the rewrite is 
imposed on the gun seller instead of the state official, and that 
state officers have the option not to perform background 
checks. These differences seem unlikely to generate 
substantially more opposition. 
Apparently recognizing that conditional preemption offers 
a cheap and easy way around Printz, Hills in the end argues 
that some exercises of conditional preemption would be invalid 
53. Indeed, the "incentive" the Court upheld in New York as conditional 
preemption relied entirely on enforcement by other states. The relevant provision 
merely permitted states to exclude from their territory waste generated by states 
that declined to adopt federally specified measures. (Without federal permission, 
such exclusion would have violated the dormant Commerce Clause.) See infra 
note 108. 
54. Hills, supra note 49, at 868. 
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under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This would 
be the case, in his view, if "(1) the condition that the [state 
officials] must meet would, if imposed unconditionally, be 
unconstitutional, and (2) Congress threatened preemption of 
[state] policy merely to gain leverage to extract compliance 
with the condition. "55 On the surface, this test appears to 
condemn all exercises of conditional preemption, but if so, it 
clashes with New York's upholding of "incentives" avowedly 
designed to "encourage" states to do what they could not be 
directly' compelled to do. Hills's elaboration of the test, 
however, suggests that it in fact places only a weak limit on the 
availability of conditional preemption. Apparently, an exercise 
of conditional preemption would be invalid only if the condition 
"served no purpose except as a device by which to punish [the 
state] for refusing to" do what Congress. wants but cannot 
directly require it to do. 56 My rewrite of the Brady Act would 
easily pass this test. A flat ban on gun sales would appear to 
advance whatever aims Congress had in enacting the Brady 
Act, albeit at a greater social cost. The suggested limit would 
apparently condemn only .conditions wholly unrelated to the 
aims of the statute. A rule invalidating such pretextual 
conditions seems unobjectionable, if perhaps inadministrable 
at the edges, but it places only weak limits on Congress.57 
Undoubtedly, the availability of conditional preemption is 
in substantial tension with the functional justification the 
Court gave in New York for the anticommandeering rule.58 
More broadly, the easy and cheap escape from· the 
anticommandeering rule that conditional preemption makes 
available is in tension with the whole thrust of the Court's 
recent federalism decisions, as well as with the widespread 
55. Id. at 924. 
56. Id. at 925. 
57. The Court has articulated a similar "nexus" requirement in the 
Spending Clause context, but the requirement as enforced by the Court poses only 
a very weak limit. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
58. As many have noted, if the problem with commandeering is that it blurs 
the lines of accountability, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 
(1992), then it is difficult to explain why exercises of the Spending Clause, 
conditional preemption, and indeed ordinary preemption are not also 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 37, at 1061-74; Hills, supra note 
49, at 826-27; Jackson, supra note 45, at 2202; Mark V. Tushnet, Why the 
Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 
1641-42 (1994). 
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belief that New York and Printz were important decisions.59 
This area of the law has seen numerous doctrinal shifts in a 
short period of time and, rather than accept defeat, the losing 
side has tended to call for further reversals of course.60 It 
would thus not be surprising if the Court decided to cut back or 
eliminate the conditional preemption doctrine. On the other 
hand, a future Court could just as easily alleviate the tension 
by overruling New York and Printz. Rather than speculate 
about how this doctrine might evolve, this article considers 
whether the anticommandeering doctrine as it currently stands 
should be considered applicable to exercises of the treaty 
power. This doctrine appears to permit a statute making the 
performance of background checks by state officials a condition 
of the sale of guns in a state. And it would permit a treaty 
requiring state officials to notify aliens they arrest that they 
have a right to consult with their consuls, but only if a treaty or 
statute prohibiting the arrest of such aliens altogether would 
be valid. It is to the latter question that I now turn. 
II. CONDITIONAL PREEMPTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY 
POWER 
As noted, the Vienna Convention effectively gives state 
officials a choice: they can either provide the required 
59. But cf Jackson, supra note 45, at 2226-27 (suggesting that the 
importance of the Court's recent federalism decisions is as a "cue" or "wake-up 
call" to Congress that it should pay more attention to federalism). See also 
PHILLIP BOBBI'IT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 190-95 
(1982) (arguing that National League of Cities v. Usery served primarily a 
"cueing" function); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the 
Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1484 (1995) (arguing that Lopez was a "wake-up call" to 
Congress). 
60. For example, the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U.S. 833 (1976), which in turn had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 
(1968). The dissenters in Garcia predicted that the principle aflirmed in National 
League of Cities would "in time again command ... a majority of [the] Court." 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 589 (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting). Similarly, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996), overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and the 
dissenters predicted that Seminole would not last long. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 
1145 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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notification or they can refrain from arresting aliens.61 This 
treaty would be a valid exercise of conditional preemption only 
if a treaty or statute prohibiting altogether the arrest of aliens 
would be valid.62 The answer to this question under current 
doctrine appears to be simple: a treaty duly ratified by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate prohibiting 
the arrest of aliens within our borders would be valid under 
Missouri v. Holland.63 Justice Holmes in that case suggested 
that there might not be any substantive limits to the treaty 
power.64 This broad position has since been qualified by the 
Court, and it is now well accepted that the federal government 
cannot do by treaty what is affirmatively prohibited by the 
Constitution.65 It could not, for example, establish religion or 
restrain the freedom of speech or of the press in violation of the 
First Amendment. But the Court's holding in Missouri v. 
Holland that the treaty power is not limited by any "invisible 
radiation" from the Tenth Amendment has survived.66 The 
Court in Holland did say that the treaty before it addressed a 
matter of the highest urgency which by its nature could only be 
adequately addressed through treaty.67 But surely the Court 
did not mean to suggest that the treaty makers' judgment 
about the urgency of the matter or the feasibility of addressing 
it other than by treaty were proper subjects of judicial review.68 
61. State officials face this choice only when they arrest an alien from a 
nation that is a party to the Vienna Convention. For simplicity's sake, I shall 
refer in the text to aliens generally. 
62. Given the existence of the Vienna Convention, a statute prohibiting 
altogether the arrest of aliens would appear to be valid as necessary and proper to 
implement the treaty. As we have seen, the treaty can be complied with if either 
notice is given or no aliens are detained. In the absence of a power directly to 
require the former, a statute requiring the latter would appear to be the second-
best way to achieve compliance with our international obligations. But this 
analysis assumes the validity of a treaty that, by its terms, gives the states two 
options, one of which (the obligation to notify) would arguably be unconstitutional 
alone. If the anticommandeering principle applies to the treaty power, then this 
treaty would be valid only if the other option would independently be valid. 
Determining the validity of the Vienna Convention as conditional preemption 
thus requires that we examine the validity of a hypothetical treaty that flatly bars 
the arrest of aliens. 
63. 252 u.s. 416 (1920). 
64. See id. at 432-33. 
65. See HENKIN, supra note 8. 
66. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. 
67. See id. at 435. 
68. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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Other cases suggest that the treaty power extends only to 
matters that have traditionally been regarded as the proper 
subjects of negotiation among nations, or that are regarded as 
appropriate subjects of treaties under internationallaw.69 Be 
that as it may, it is clear that the treatment of aliens has long 
been regarded as an appropriate subject of negotiation between 
the United States and the countries of which the aliens are 
nationals. Treaties giving aliens certain rights date back to the 
beginning of our history and have long been applied to the 
states.70 The validity of treaties giving aliens immunities from 
civil suits or criminal prosecutions has never seriously been 
questioned. 71 
Recently, scholars have argued that the broad 
understanding of the treaty power reflected in Missouri u. 
Holland should be reconsidered. 72 In a recent article, Professor 
Curtis Bradley has argued that the virtually unlimited treaty 
power the Court recognized in Holland produces a loophole 
permitting the circumvention of the limitations on the 
commerce power the Court has recently embraced in such cases 
as United States u. Lopez.73 He accordingly suggests that the 
treaty power be construed to extend only to those subjects over 
69. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 302 (1987). 
70. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
71. The Vienna Convention itself gives foreign consuls some such 
immunities, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 9, arts. 41, 43, 
and other treaties give foreign diplomats and their families certain immunities. 
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 29, 23 
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Indeed, such immunities are conferred by statutes 
and federal common law as well. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") 
immunizes foreign states from suits in federal or state courts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 
1605 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), and defines "foreign state" in such a way as to 
encompass foreign individuals in certain circumstances. See Chuidian v. 
Phillippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 1990). Before the FSIA was 
enacted, foreign sovereign immunity was regarded as a matter of federal common 
law. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 202-10 (3d ed. 1996). To the extent it is not governed by the 
FSIA, the immunity of current and former heads of state continues to be governed 
by federal common law. See id. at 284-85. These immunities of course bind 
executive and well as judicial officers of the states. 
72. Cf. Healy, supra note 11, at 1750-56 (stating that while recent 
federalism cases could be read to limit treaty power, adoption of federalism-based 
limits on treaty power would be unwise and unnecessary). 
73. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 425-26. 
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1339 1999
1999] PRINTZ AND THE TREATY POWER 1339 
which Congress otherwise possesses legislative power.74 My 
own view is that the risk that the limits imposed by such cases 
as Lopez would be circumvented through use of the treaty 
power is overstated, given the requirement that treaties be 
approved by two-thirds of the Senate.75 Moreover, the limits 
articulated in Lopez concern the extent of the commerce power 
and thus have little apparent relevance to the scope of a wholly 
separate head of federal power.76 Any suggestion that the 
74. See id. at 450. Bradley thus urges, in effect, that the treaty power be 
construed as if the Bricker Amendment had been adopted. 
75. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. Bradley is legitimately concerned about the 
opportunity for circumvention that would be available if the limitations reflected 
in the Tenth Amendment were inapplicable to congressional-executive 
agreements. But, rather than subject the treaty power to such limitations, I 
would hold that congressional-executive agreements are subject to those limits, as 
they are not "treaties" in the constitutional sense. This is not, of course, to say 
that congressional-executive agreements such as NAFTA are not valid laws. 
Compare Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 799 (1995) (concluding that they are valid), with Tribe, supra note 7 
(concluding that they are not valid). See also David Golove, Against Free-Form 
Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998) (a rejoinder to Tribe). 
A problem not separately addressed by Bradley may be of greater concern: 
often treaties express broad aspirations in precatory terms. To hold that such 
broad, precatory provisions may support congressional legislation that would not 
be within Congress's legislative power in the absence of the treaty seems 
potentially problematic. But a response better tailored to this concern than 
Bradley's would simply hold that Congress's power to implement treaties does not 
encompass the power to enact legislation to implement clearly aspirational or 
precatory treaty provisions. Whether this limitation is in fact warranted is a 
subject for another day. 
76. Professor Bradley may be constructing his theory around an 
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment as reserving certain areas of regulation to 
the states no matter what power Congress is purporting to exercise. But even the 
Supreme Court opinions most protective of state sovereignty have not adopted 
such an interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., National League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 & n.17 (1976) (stating that the limits 
articulated in the case do not necessarily apply to exercises of the spending power 
or the Fourteenth Amendment), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); id. at 855 n.18 (stating that the limits 
articulated in the case do not necessarily apply to exercises of the war power). 
If the subject-matter limits the Constitution places on the legislative powers 
enumerated in Article I and elsewhere do not apply to the treaty power, then the 
very idea of "circumvention" of these limits by the treaty makers is problematic. 
The treaty makers could not be accused of "circumventing" these limits just 
because they have concluded a treaty on a matter falling outside the federal 
legislative power, for these limits by hypothesis would not apply. On the other 
hand, they would arguably be circumventing these limits if they concluded the 
treaty solely or primarily to evade the constitutional limits on the federal 
legislative power. If this is the nature of the circumvention claim, however, I 
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treaty power authorizes only such treaties as would fall within 
the commerce power if enacted by Congress would be 
doctrinally implausible, as it would call into question the 
validity of treaties which, like the Vienna Convention, impose 
certain requirements regarding the treatment of aliens. While 
certain obligations imposed by such treaties might fall within 
the commerce power, other long-unquestioned provisions 
common to treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
("FCN"), and other treaties, might not. For example, the 
United States is party to treaties that undertake to provide 
foreign military personnel certain immunities from the 
criminal jurisdiction of the state and federal governments,77 
and FCN treaties commonly prohibit discrimination against 
aliens in noncommercial matters.78 
think the requirement that treaties be approved by two-thirds of the Senate 
affords adequate protection. 
My argument that the Constitution protects states from exorbitant exercises 
of the treaty power structurally rather than through subject-matter limits should 
not be understood as an endorsement of the position of the majority in Garcia that 
the only protection the Constitution offers states from exercises of the federal 
legislative power is the structural protection afforded by the "national political 
process." 469 U.S. at 554, 555; see also Herbert Wecshler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection 
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Constitution 
extends the federal legislative power to enumerated subjects, and this seems to 
imply that other subjects are beyond the legislative power. If so, then the 
Constitution appears to give a state the right to go its own way on those other 
matters, no matter how large a majority of the other states wants to force it to toe 
the line. The "national political process" does not protect that right. By contrast, 
the Constitution does not enumerate the proper (or improper) subjects of treaties. 
With respect to the treaty power, therefore, the claim that the Constitution 
contemplates only a structural protection for the states is consistent with the 
constitutional text. 
77. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 
U.N.T.S. 67; Agreement Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
Government of the United States of America Concerning the Application of Part 
IV of the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
National Representatives and International Staff, Signed in Ottawa on September 
20, 1951, to the Officials of NATO Civilian Bodies Located on the Territory of the 
United States of America, Mar. 3, 1981, 33 U.S.T. 1272, 1307 U.N.T.S. 423. 
78. For example, the FCN treaty with Japan in force at the turn of the 
century, as interpreted both by the United States and Japanese governments, 
prohibited discrimination against Japanese citizens with respect to education. 
When the United States brought suit against school authorities of San Francisco 
to enforce this treaty, the question whether the treaty exceeded the scope of the 
treaty power was fully mooted. The story is told in ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE 
TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 145-59, at 
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In any event, Bradley suggests that the Constitution be 
read to authorize treaties that would otherwise fall within any 
of Congress's legislative powers, and those legislative powers 
include the power to define and punish offenses against the law 
of nations,79 to raise and support armies,80 to pass statutes 
necessary and proper to effectuate the President's commander-
in-chief power,81 and even the nontextual "foreign affairs" 
power, not to mention the war power.82 Treaties that could not 
be upheld as falling within the commerce power could well be 
upheld as falling within one or more of those powers; but, if so, 
it is unclear what is gained by the doctrinal change Professor 
Bradley advocates. A rule that would uphold treaties under 
the treaty power only if they also fell within one of Congress's 
other legislative powers would put pressure on the 
constitutional provisions delineating Congress's powers in the 
foreign affairs area, shifting the debate to different ground 
without materially advancing the analysis.83 Those troubled by 
142-89 (1908). The suit became moot when the school authorities withdrew the 
offending resolution. See id. § 159, at 189. FCN treaties also commonly prohibit 
discrimination with respect to criminal prosecutions. Education and criminal law 
were both regarded by the Court in Lopez as areas traditionally reserved to the 
states. 
The FCN treaty concluded with Prussia in 1786 protected Prussian citizens 
against state legislation denying freedom of conscience or religious worship, "and 
when dying they were guaranteed the right of decent burial and undisturbed rest 
for their bodies." Id. at 186 n.92 (quoting Mr. Bancroft Davis summarizing the 
provisions of the treaty). The First Amendment would not be made applicable to 
the states until after the Civil War, yet this treaty was declared in the 
Constitution to be the "supreme Law of the Land." It is evidence that the 
Founders did not regard the treaty power to be limited to matters falling within 
Congress's legislative power under Article I. 
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.lO. 
80. See id. cl. 12. 
81. See id. cl. 18. 
82. See id. cl. 11. 
83. For example, perhaps a treaty iiiUp.unizing foreign military personnel 
from the criminal jurisdiction of state and federal governments could be justified 
under the power to raise and support armies, combined with the power to enact 
laws necessary and proper to implement the President's commander-in-chief 
power, on the ground that the reciprocal undertaking by foreign states helps 
protect our military abroad. One might justify under the same provisions a treaty 
undertaking to protect the human rights of our nationals on the theory that the 
reciprocal promise by other parties might help forestall international crises such 
as those in Kosovo, Bosnia, or Somalia that might call for action on the part of the 
United States military that might endanger the safety of our troops. 
Alternatively, one might say that prohibiting states from exercising criminal 
jurisdiction over foreign military is a valid exercise of the power to define and 
punish offenses against the law of nations. But if the powers of Congress in the 
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"treaty power exceptionalism," as Professor Bradley is,84 should 
be even more troubled by "foreign affairs exceptionalism," as 
the latter, unlike the former, gives exceptional powers to 
Congress as well as the treaty makers, and ordinary legislation 
does not require the concurrence of a supermajority. 
The fact is that the power to make treaties is not just the 
power to make laws on the same subjects by other means; it is 
the power to make laws on subjects not otherwise falling within 
Congress's legislative power. One subject that has long been 
regarded as within the treaty-making power, but in certain 
contexts might not fall within the legislative power in the 
absence of a treaty, is the treatment of aliens within the United 
States. The narrowest and least controversial ground on which 
to uphold treaties addressing the treatment of aliens would be 
that this subject has always been regarded as an appropriate 
one for negotiation among nations. For that very reason, a 
proposed limitation on the treaty power that would disable the 
federal government from entering into such treaties is not an 
eligible interpretation of the Constitution. 
Although a treaty addressing the treatment of aliens 
would clearly fall within the scope of the treaty power as 
traditionally construed, other sorts of treaties might be 
vulnerable if the test of the scope of the treaty-making power 
were tradition. Specifically, treaties limiting the discretion of 
states-parties with respect to the treatment of their own 
citizens are an innovation of the post-World War II era, and 
some such treaties include notification provisions similar to 
that of the Vienna Convention. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, ·for example, requires that certain 
information be given to all persons arrested by the state.85 
area of foreign affairs would support the treaties that under Bradley's thesis the 
treaty power alone would not support, then the suggested analysis imposes no 
substantive limitation at all. 
84. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 394. 
85. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
art. 9(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. It is likely that this provision requires no more than 
what our Constitution independently requires. If so, the question whether the 
provision violates the anticommandeering principle is academic. It is 
nevertheless worth discussing the issue, as human rights treaties could in theory 
seek to require notifications going beyond constitutional requirements. For 
similar reasons, I shall disregard for the time being the reservations, 
understandings, and declarations the United States attached to its ratification of 
this treaty. 
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Upholding such a treaty under a conditional preemption theory 
would require the conclusion that a treaty prohibiting states 
from arresting any person would be valid. Such a treaty would 
no doubt be politically and practically problematic, and for that 
very reason we can be confident that the President and Senate 
would not agree to it. But, if it were made, would it be 
unconstitutional? It could perhaps be argued that a treaty may 
not constitutionally regulate a state's treatment of its own 
citizens because that has not traditionally been regarded as a 
proper subject of negotiation with other nations. On the other 
hand, the treaty power may be said to embrace whatever 
subjects the international community at any given time 
regards as a proper subject for negotiation among nations, and 
today international law clearly addresses a state's treatment of 
its own citizens. On this issue, I find myself in agreement with 
Professor Bradley, who agrees with Professor Louis Henkin 
that the first interpretation would be highly undesirable and is 
unsupported by the Framers' intent.86 
At any rate, unless Missouri u. Holland is reconsidered, it 
appears that there are no limits on the treaty power grounded 
in state sovereignty. The states' sole protection from 
exorbitant exercises of the treaty power is the structural 
requirement that treaties receive the consent of two-thirds of 
the Senate. The federal government thus appears to be even 
less constrained in its ability to use conditional preemption in 
treaties than in statutes.87 
86. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 451-52 (citing Louis Henkin, The 
Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 
1021 (1968)). Bradley also rejects the suggestion that the treaty power be limited 
to matters "international" on the ground that today "almost any issue can 
plausibly be labeled 'international."' !d. Of course, as discussed above, the 
recognition that in today's world almost everything has international 
ramifications may equally justify the conclusion that almost anything can be 
supported by the federal government's commander-in-chief or foreign affairs 
powers. See supra note 83. 
87. It is admittedly strange to rely on the constitutionality of a treaty the 
federal government did not and never would conclude as support for the 
conclusion that a different treaty the government did conclude would be 
constitutional, particularly when the constitutionality of the hypothetical treaty 
rests on the existence of structural protections that virtually guarantee that it 
will never be agreed to. This problem, however, inheres in any doctrine that 
rests, as the conditional preemption doctrine does, on the argument that a greater 
power includes a lesser one. 
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III. COMMANDEERING VS. PREEMPTION 
There is another possible problem with the conditional 
preemption rationale for upholding the consular notification 
provision: there is some basis for concluding that a treaty 
barring states from arresting aliens would violate the 
anticommandeering principle itself. According to some courts 
and commentators, Printz and New York invalidate any federal 
statute that imposes obligations on states without also 
imposing them on private parties, or regulates states in their 
governmental roles. If so, then a statute prohibiting the arrest 
of aliens, unlike a statute imposing a ban on the sale of guns, 
would be invalid. I conclude that, if Printz and New York were 
so construed, then the anticommandeering principle cannot 
limit the treaty power. But I also conclude that these broad 
interpretations are implausible even in the purely domestic, 
nontreaty context. 
The precise scope of the anticommandeering principle 
embraced in New York and Printz is currently a matter of some 
disagreement among the federal courts. New York involved a 
provision requiring the state affirmatively to regulate the 
activities of private parties according to federal standards. 
Printz involved an obligation to perform affirmative acts in 
administering a federal scheme governing the rights and 
liabilities of private parties. One might thus conclude that the 
federal government "commandeers" state officials only when it 
compels them to perform affirmative acts, such as conducting 
background checks or notifying aliens of their right to consult 
with their consuls. On this view, the anticommandeering 
principle does not reach a federal obligation not to do 
something, such as the obligation not to detain aliens from 
certain countries. 
On the other hand, the Court in New York distinguished 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,88 among 
other cases, on the ground that they involved federal statutes 
that imposed the same obligations on states as on private 
parties,89 and the Court in Printz acknowledged that 
88. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
89. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992). The majority 
opinion in Garcia noted that the statute placed the same obligation on public and 
private employers, 469 U.S. at 554, but it did not make much of that fact. Justice 
Blackmun's original draft of the Garcia decision, however, apparently would have 
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1345 1999
1999] PRINTZ AND THE TREATY POWER 1345 
distinction.90 This may suggest that Congress has the power to 
impose obligations on states, even of a prohibitory character, 
only if it also imposes the obligation on private parties.91 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in 
Condon v. Reno,92 adopted this interpretation of Printz and 
New York, and accordingly struck down a federal statute, the 
Drivers' Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), which prohibits 
states from revealing in certain circumstances information 
received on drivers' license applications, on the ground that the 
statute does not impose the same prohibition on private 
databases.93 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit has struck down the DPPA on similar 
grounds.94 Though these holdings extend Printz and New York 
beyond what the term "commandeering'' seems to denote, they 
are supported not just by the Court's distinction of Garcia and 
similar cases in New York and Printz, and by the difficulty of 
distinguishing affirmative from negative obligations, but also 
by the Court's suggestion in New York that a statute requiring 
the state to take title to radioactive waste, standing alone, 
would violate the anticommandeering principle. Such a statute 
would address only the conduct of states and would not directly 
require affirmative acts.95 
established this as the test of the constitutionality of federal statutes regulating 
states. See Tushnet, supra note 58, at 1629. 
90. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930-31 (1997). 
91. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Earthrights International Supporting the 
Appeal of Defendants/Appellants Laskey and Anderson Urging Reversal at 9, 
National Foreign Trade Council v. Laskey, No. 98-2304 (1st Cir. filed Feb. 5, 1999) 
("The Tenth Amendment . . . frowns upon laws that seek to regulate States 
without applying identical restrictions to private parties."). 
92. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, Mar. 15, 1999 (No. 
98-1464). 
93. See id. 
94. See Pryor v. Reno, No. 98-6262, 1999 WL 187050 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 
1999). The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has upheld the DPPA. See United 
States v. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d 1266 (lOth Cir. 1998). In these cases, the federal 
government appears not to have pressed the argument that Printz does not apply 
to prohibitory statutes. But cf Pryor, 1999 WL 187050, at *4 n.5 (referring to, 
and rejecting as inaccurate, "the United States' argument that the Act does not 
command the States to do anything because the States may simply opt out of this 
legislation by deciding to close their DMV records completely"). It stressed 
instead that the DPPA does not require the states to regulate private parties in a 
given manner (which Printz bars), but rather regulates the states directly (which 
Printz permits). See, e.g., Condon, 155 F.3d at 461. It is unclear how our 
hypothetical statute barring the arrest of all aliens would fare under such a test. 
95. See Caminker, supra note 20, at 235-36. 
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In Travis v. Reno,96 the Seventh Circuit upheld the DPPA, 
but there is less difference than meets the eye between its 
interpretation of Printz and New York and that of the Fourth 
and Eleventh Circuits. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
DPPA was constitutional because (1) it "affects states as 
owners of databases; it does not affect them in their role as 
governments,"97 and (2) the burdens imposed on states by the 
DPPA are not significantly greater than those imposed on 
private databases by other federal statutes governing similar 
matters.98 Thus, a federal statute would presumably violate 
the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Printz and New York if 
it either affected the states in their role as governments or 
imposed on states significantly greater burdens than federal 
law imposes on private parties engaging in similar conduct. 
A statute prohibiting states from arresting aliens would 
appear to violate the tests articulated by these courts. It would 
violate the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' test because it does 
not also regulate private parties. It may satisfy the second 
prong of the Seventh Circuit's test, since other rules of law 
place significant limits on the power of private parties to arrest 
aliens,99 but for that very reason it would fail the first prong. 
Private parties have only limited authority to arrest aliens 
because arresting people is a function of government. Because 
a treaty prohibiting the arrest of aliens would affect the states 
"in their role as governments," the statute would be invalid 
under the Seventh Circuit's reading of Printz and New York. 
If Printz and New York condemn all laws placing 
obligations on states that are not also imposed on private 
parties, or affecting the states in their role as governments, 
subjecting the treaty power to this limitation would be highly 
problematic. Unlike the Constitution, federal statutes often 
address the conduct of private parties, and when they do 
impose obligations on states they often impose on them the 
same obligations they impose on private parties. Thus, while 
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits' interpretations of Printz may 
96. 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998). 
97. Id. at 1004. The Eleventh Circuit, too, stressed that the DPPA regulated 
"an exercise of sovereignty." Pryor, 1999 WL 187050, at *6. 
98. See id. at 1005-06. 
99. The second prong may not be satisfied because the limits on the power of 
private parties to arrest aliens have their source in state law. Even if this prong 
were satisfied, however, the first would not be. 
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be problematic with respect to statutes, at least those 
interpretations would reach only the atypical statute. Treaties, 
however, resemble the Constitution in this respect more than 
they resemble statutes. As a general matter, treaties address 
the rights and obligations of governments vis-a-vis each other, 
and they typically apply to state action. The ratification 
debates on which the Court relied in New York to show that the 
Framers contemplated a regime in which the federal 
government would act directly on individuals are particularly 
instructive on this question. As Justice O'Connor explained, 
the Framers regarded the regime set up by the Articles of 
Confederation to be ineffective because the Articles gave the 
federal government the power to act only upon the states as 
political bodies; the Constitution, on the other hand, gave the 
federal government the power to act directly upon 
individuals.100 What is important for present purposes is the 
Framers' description of the regime they rejected, the one 
permitting the government to act only on states, as a "treaty" 
regime.101 The Framers thus recognized that treaties, unlike 
statutes, generally do not impose duties directly on private 
individuals. Even when a treaty's ultimate object is the 
protection or regulation of individuals, it typically accomplishes 
that goal by placing obligations, whether of an affirmative or 
negative character, on the states-parties. When the obligation 
is of a negative character, moreover, it presumptively applies to 
governmental actors in the states-parties at alllevels. 102 Thus, 
an anticommandeering rule that bars the imposition of 
obligations on states that are not also imposed on private 
individuals would invalidate the typical rather than the odd 
treaty. The same would be true of a rule barring treaties that 
affect states "in their role as governments." Accordingly, 
neither rule could plausibly apply to the treaty power. 
Supreme Court decisions upholding treaties of this nature 
without so much as hinting at a Tenth Amendment problem 
confirm that, if the anticommandeering principle is indeed that 
broad, it does not apply to the treaty power. For example, in 
100. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-65 (1992). 
101. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and 
Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097-1101 (1992). 
102. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (7th rev. ed. 1996). 
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Asakura v. Seattle,103 the Court gave effect to a provision of an 
FCN treaty with Japan providing that "[t]he citizens or 
subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have 
liberty to ... carry on trade ... upon the same terms as native 
citizens or subjects."104 Relying on this treaty, the Court held 
that a Seattle ordinance making noncitizens ineligible for 
pawnbroker licenses could not validly be applied to Japanese 
citizens.105 The Court effectively interpreted the treaty to 
require Seattle to issue licenses to Japanese citizens as long as 
it issued licenses to United States citizens, and upon the same 
terms. (The treaty-based prohibition thus required the state to 
perform affirmative acts-evaluate the license applications of 
Japanese citizens-that they wo-uld not have had to perform in 
the absence of the treaty.)106 This is just one of many treaties 
given effect by the Supreme Court that affected the states in 
their role as governments and placed obligations on state 
actors without also placing them on private actors. 
Interpreting the anticommandeering principle of New York and 
Printz to invalidate such obligations would thus require the 
rejection of numerous treaty precedents. Since the Court in 
Printz regarded the absence of contrary precedents as a reason 
for extending the holding of New York to statutes that 
commandeer executive officials, 107 it seems safe to say that, if 
the anticommandeering principle would invalidate federal laws 
affecting states in their role as governments or placing 
obligations on states but not private parties, then the 
anticommandeering principle does not apply to exercises of the 
treaty power. 
Indeed, the doctrinal case for the broad interpretations of 
Printz and New York just discussed seems weak even outside 
the treaty context. The Supreme Court has long recognized, 
albeit largely in what is arguably dicta, that Congress has the 
power to enact laws addressing solely the governmental 
103. 265 u.s. 332 (1923). 
104. Id. at 340 (quoting Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911, 
U.S.-Japan, 37 Stat. 1504). 
105. See id. at 341-42. 
106. Today, this nondiscrimination obligation is required by the 
Constitution, but at the time the Equal Protection Clause had not been 
interpreted to apply to aliens. The plaintiff in Asakura raised a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim, see id. at 340, but the Court chose to resolve the case on the 
basis of the treaty. 
107. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-09 (1997). 
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activities of states. In dormant Commerce Clause cases, for 
example, the Court has long made clear that Congress has the 
power to enact legislation allowing state regulation that would 
otherwise run afoul of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, 108 or to strike down state legislation that it 
regards as prejudicial to the national interest in free interstate 
commerce, even if the statute does not violate the Commerce 
Clause in its self-executing operation.109 In Barclays Bank PLC 
v. Franchise Tax Board, 110 the Court upheld California's 
"worldwide combined reporting'' method of determining the 
amount of tax owed by certain corporate groups against a 
challenge based on the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 
relying in part on the fact that Congress had long been aware 
of California's approach and had declined to enact a law 
prohibiting it. The Court's express recognition that Congress 
has the power to prohibit states from using this method of 
taxation rebuts the claim that Congress lacks the power to 
regulate states in their role as governments or to impose 
negative obligations on the states that do not also apply to 
private parties. Private parties, after all, do not engage in 
taxation. Similarly, it is well accepted that Congress has the 
power simply to bar state regulation in a particular field of 
commerce without supplying an alternative federal regulatory 
scheme. Such a statute does nothing more than prohibit state 
regulation, in apparent violation of the broad interpretations of 
Printz and New York. 111 Even in the statutory context, 
therefore, Printz and New York cannot plausibly be construed 
to invalidate all federal laws that affect states in their 
108. The second incentive upheld in New York was upheld as a conditional 
exercise of Congress's power to approve state action that otherwise would have 
been barred by the dormant Commerce Clause. See New York v. United States, 
505 u.s. 144, 173-74 (1992). 
109. Indeed, Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Printz, 
would, in the absence of stare decisis concerns, replace entirely the Court's 
practice of striking down state statutes on dormant Commerce Clause grounds 
with a congressional power to invalidate state statutes that, in its vj.ew, 
contravene the national interest in a free market. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. 
Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring & dissenting). 
110. 512 u.s. 298 (1994). 
111. See Tushnet, supra note 58, at 1641-42. 
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governmental roles or impose obligations on the states that 
they do not also impose on private individuals.112 
IV. PRINTZ AND THE TREATY POWER 
If Printz and New York do not invalidate all federal 
statutes imposing obligations on states without also imposing 
them on private individuals, or affecting states in their role as 
governments, then what is the scope of the anticommandeering 
principle? Without answering that question, it is impossible to 
reach firm conclusions about Printz's applicability to the treaty 
power. 
There are a number of possible answers. First, Printz and 
New York may invalidate only federal statutes that impose on 
state legislatures or executive officials the obligation to act 
affirmatively to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
scheme. On this view, federal statutes that merely prohibit 
conduct by the states would not violate the anticommandeering 
principle, even if the prohibition did not apply to private 
parties. As we have seen, it is notoriously difficult to draw the 
line between affirmative and negative obligations. Should the 
treaty obligation at issue in Asakura, for instance, be regarded 
as merely the negative obligation not to discriminate against 
Japanese citizens, or should it be regarded as the affirmative 
obligation to give Japanese citizens the same rights as United 
States citizens?113 On the other hand, a distinction between 
112. See also Matthew Schaefer, Twenty-First-Century Trade Negotiations, 
the US Constitution, and the Elimination of US State-Level Protectionism, 2 J. 
INT'L ECON. L. 1, 20-29 (1999) (describing provisions of congressional-executive 
agreements that would be called into question by the broad interpretation of 
Printz and New York under discussion here, and citing additional nontreaty case 
law that calls into question that broad interpretation). 
113. The United States defended the constitutionality of a similar 
nondiscrimination obligation against a challenge based on the Tenth Amendment 
on the ground that the treaty was merely prohibitory: 
It was not contended that the state was obligated to supply education, 
but that if a state did choose to supply education as a governmental 
function, it could not discriminate, and that while the state was at 
liberty to maintain a school system or not, yet if it did provide such a 
school system, the schools of which alien children generally were 
permitted to attend, it could not exclude the alien children of any 
particular nation enjoying treaty rights. In other words, the provision of 
the treaty placed no obligation upon the state, was in no sense 
compulsory, but was negative and prohibitory. 
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affirmative and negative obligations is supported by the 
Court's description of "commandeering'' as the "administ[ration 
of] a federal regulatory program"114-indeed, by the very term 
"commandeering." Recognition of the federal government's 
power to preempt state law appears to require that at least 
some negative obligations be exempted from the 
anticommandeering principle, as state officials are undoubtedly 
subject to the obligation not to enforce state laws that conflict 
with federal laws regulating private conduct, or to interfere 
with federal officers enforcing such laws.115 If New York and 
Printz contemplate such a distinction, however, an obligation 
could not be counted as affirmative merely because a state 
would have to take affirmative preparatory steps to ensure that 
its officers comply with a legal prohibition.116 
Alternatively, New York and Printz might be construed to 
prohibit federal statutes that impose even negative obligations 
on states, but only if the statutes do not impose the same 
prohibition on the federal government. 117 This would modify 
DEVLIN, supra note 78, § 150, at 162-64. 
114. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see also Travis v. 
Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[S)tates cannot be compelled to 
become regulators of private conduct."). 
115. The majority in Printz recognized the latter obligation. See Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997). 
116. Even if a nondiscrimination obligation were regarded as affirmative, 
such a treaty provision could perhaps be upheld as an exercise of conditional 
preemption: the state is given a choice between treating aliens equally or 
withdrawing from the field. The treaty in Asakura, for example, might be 
understood to give Seattle the choice between granting licenses to Japanese 
citizens and withdrawing from the regulation of the pawnbroker business. It is 
noteworthy that this analysis would validate nondiscrimination provisions only if 
Missouri v. Holland survived in all its breadth. The federal government no doubt 
has the power to require the states to withdraw from the regulation of 
pawnbroker businesses under the Commerce Clause, but treaties prohibit 
discrimination in noncommercial areas traditionally regulated by the states, such 
as education, see supra note 78, and such treaties would no doubt be valid even if 
the Equal Protection Clause did not independently prohibit discrimination in 
those areas. The conditional preemption doctrine would validate a treaty barring 
discrimination in education, however, only if we accepted that a treaty barring the 
states from regulating education would be valid. The United States has advanced 
precisely that argument. See supra note 113. 
117. Cf Jackson, supra note 45, at 2208 n.126 (noting that "Solicitor 
General Bork's argument in support of the FLSA in National League of Cities ... 
suggested that Congress was constrained by a requirement for such equivalency"); 
see also Tushnet, supra note 58, at 1649 (suggesting this argument as a basis for 
upholding a federal statute struck down by the Ninth Circuit on the basis of New 
York). 
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only slightly the Court's reason for distinguishing Garcia and 
similar cases. Rather than distinguish these cases as involving 
statutes that impose on states the same obligations they 
impose on private parties, the Court could distinguish them on 
the ground that they do not single out the states for regulation. 
A statute that regulates functions performed only by 
governments, such as taxation, does not single out states for 
regulation if the statute imposes the same obligation on the 
federal government.118 
Either of the foregoing narrow interpretations of Printz 
would meet the objections identified above to applying the 
anticommandeering rule to the treaty power. The main 
problem with applying Printz to the treaty power is that 
negative obligations imposed by treaties typically (1) apply only 
to governmental actors and (2) apply to governmental actors at 
all levels. An interpretation of the anticommandeering 
principle that disabled the federal government from placing 
negative obligations on states unless it imposed the same 
obligations on private individuals would accordingly severely 
limit the treaty power. Limiting Printz to affirmative 
obligations would largely eliminate this problem, so long as 
"affirmative" were defined narrowly. Treaties do sometimes 
impose affirmative obligations on states-parties of a sort 
analogous to that involved in the Printz case, but exempting 
the states from such obligations is problematic only when the 
required affirmative acts are triggered by, or otherwise 
connected to, activities that states are already performing. 
Again, this problem would disappear if the federal government 
retained the power to impose negative obligations on the 
states. The federal government would then have the power to 
give the states a choice between (1) not performing the 
triggering act and (2) performing the triggering act and 
complying with the triggered obligation. Nor would the treaty 
power be significantly obstructed by a rule tying the federal 
government's power to impose negative obligations on the 
states to its willingness to assume the obligations itself, for, 
like the nondiscrimination provision involved in Asakura and 
118. Perhaps some combination of the above would be acceptable: states 
cannot be compelled affirmatively to enforce a federal regulatory scheme, and 
they can be subjected to negative obligations only if the same obligations are 
imposed on similarly situated private parties or on the federal government. 
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the consular notification provision involved in Breard, most 
treaties that impose negative or conditional obligations impose 
the same obligations on state and federal governments.119 
When a treaty imposes an obligation to perform 
affirmative acts and the obligation is not triggered by or 
otherwise connected to governmental activities the states are 
currently carrying out, an interpretation of Printz as barring 
the federal government from requiring the states to perform 
those acts appears to pose no special difficulties. To the extent 
the treaty contemplates such affirmative acts of executive 
officials, there will usually be no question that the relevant 
acts are to be performed by federal officials. As a matter of 
international law, there would be no obstacle to assigning such 
obligations to state officials. Disabling the federal government 
from doing so as a matter of domestic constitutional law might 
perhaps be undesirable, but not more so in the treaty context 
than in the purely domestic context.120 
With respect to treaties that require affirmative acts of a 
legislative nature, the narrow interpretation of New York and 
Printz has considerable appeal. Treaties that require 
affirmative acts of legislation have a long history. They are 
known as non-self-executing treaties. One of the principal 
problems with the Articles of Confederation was that states 
were violating federal treaties and the federal government 
lacked the power to compel compliance or remedy violations.121 
This problem was caused in part by the courts' adherence to 
the British rule, under which treaties did not have direct effect 
as domestic law, but always had to be incorporated into 
domestic law through legislation. While state courts applying 
119. Such a limitation would, however, call into question provisions of 
nontreaty international agreements that have been given domestic effect through 
legislation. See Schaefer, supra note 112, at 23-29. 
120. Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Printz noted some benefits that 
might be gained from such commandeering. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-78 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). For example, it may be more efficient to require state 
officials to do certain things than to establish a whole new federal bureaucracy for 
the purpose. See id. at 977. This would appear to be true, however, only if what 
we want the state officers to do is related to something they are already doing. If 
so, then the federal government's ability to give the states a choice between doing 
the new thing or being barred from doing the old thing should eliminate the 
problem. 
121. See generally Vazquez, supra note 101; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The 
"Self-Executing" Character of the Refugee Protocol's Non-Refoulement Obligation, 
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39 (1993). 
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the British rule were refusing to give effect to treaties directly, 
state legislatures were failing to pass the required legislation 
and the federal government lacked the power to do so. The 
Founders corrected this problem by making treaties the 
"supreme Law of the Land" and thus enforceable by the courts 
without the need for intervening acts of legislation.122 Despite 
this history, United States courts have long recognized a 
category of treaty that is not directly enforceable by judges or 
other domestic-law-applying officials without implementing 
legislation. The circumstances in which a treaty is properly 
held to be non-self-executing need not be examined here.123 For 
present purposes what is important is that the power to 
implement non-self-executing treaties has always been thought 
to reside in the federal government. To apply the 
anticommandeering principle to the treaty power would be to 
hold that the federal government not only has the power to 
implement non-self-executing treaties, but also, as a 
constitutional matter, the sole and exclusive duty to do so-a 
duty that may not be delegated to the states.124 
Perhaps ironically, applying Printz and New York to the 
treaty power would call into question the constitutionality of 
the policy · reflected in the so-called "federalism" 
understandings the United States has recently attached to the 
122. See generally Vazquez, supra note 101, at 1101-14. 
123. On this question, see generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four 
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995). 
124. In which branches of the federal government this duty resides is of 
course a different question. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding Congress's power to delegate to the President in 
the area of foreign affairs even if a similar delegation would be unconstitutional in 
the purely domestic area). 
If a treaty is not self-executing, the federal government has a duty to enact 
legislation if the treaty requires domestic-law-applying officials to do or not to do 
certain things and existing law does not impose such a requirement on such 
officials. Curtis Bradley has suggested to me that, while there may be a duty 
under international law to enact legislation, it does not follow that there is a duty 
to do so under domestic law. I admit that a federal duty to enact legislation is one 
that cannot be judicially enforced, as Congress cannot be made a defendant before 
a court. See also Printz, 521 U.S. at 975 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he essence of 
legislative power, within the limits of legislative jurisdiction, is a discretion not 
subject to command."). I am also sympathetic to the claim that a judicially 
unenforceable duty is not a legal duty at all. See Vazquez, supra note 101, at 
1089-91. Nevertheless, the Constitution designates "all" treaties of the United 
States as the "supreme Law of the Land," and thus appears to rule out the claim 
that a treaty that requires implementing legislation does not impose a domestic-
law duty to enact such legislation. 
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human rights treaties it has ratified. The. understanding 
attached to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights is typical: 
[T]he United States' understands that this Covenant shall 
be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent 
that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the 
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and 
local governments; to the extent that state and local 
governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the 
Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the 
Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of 
the state or local governments may take appropriate 
measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant. 125 
The intended purpose of this understanding is a matter of some 
uncertainty. Among the other reservations, understandings, 
and declarations ("RUDs") attached to these treaties is one 
declaring the treaties to be non-self-executing. Still other 
RUDs purport to limit the substantive obligations undertaken 
by the United States pursuant to these treaties so that, in the 
end, the treaties require no more than what our domestic 
Constitution independently requires. As commentators have 
pointed out, however, notwithstanding the reservations, 
discrepancies remain between these treaties and our domestic 
laws.126 To the extent discrepancies exist, the non-self-
executing declaration (assuming it is binding and effective) 
means that the treaty does not itself preempt inconsistent 
laws, but instead requires implementing legislation. The 
federalism understanding, in turn, appears to provide that, in 
certain circumstances, the responsibility for passing the 
required legislation will be shouldered by the states rather 
than the federal government. The understanding does not 
appear to be designed merely to notify other parties that 
certain matters are beyond the federal government's power 
under our Constitution. If Missouri v. Holland is still good law, 
the federal government has the power to implement these 
treaties to the extent they do not contravene the affirmative 
125. 138 CONG REC. 84781, 84784 (1992) (setting out the understandings 
which apply to the obligations of the United States under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
126. See Neuman, supra note 7, at 50-51. 
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prohibitions of the Constitution. The authors of the 
understanding appear to recognize this by stating that the 
treaties shall be implemented by the United States only insofar 
as it "exercises" jurisdiction over the relevant matters. 
Through this understanding, the federal government seems to 
be saying that, even though it possesses legislative power to 
implement the treaty, it does not intend to exercise that power 
unless it has already legislated over the subject matter. This 
understanding, of course, does not diminish in the slightest the 
United States's obligation under international law to pass the 
required legislation, 127 and under international law it is a 
matter of indifference whether the required legislation is 
passed by the federal government or by the fifty states 
separately. Thus, the federalism understanding, alongside the 
non-self-executing declaration, appears to commandeer state 
legislatures to pass the laws the treaty requires. Such a 
requirement is something even dissenters in Printz regarded as 
unconstitutional. 128 
Professor Gerald Neuman has noted the tension between 
the anticommandeering principle and the federalism 
understandings, but concludes that "this observation may 
illustrate the inapplicability of New York v. United States to 
exercises of the treaty power, and the weakness of the evidence 
for the anticommandeering principle in general."129 I do not 
agree. The evidence for the anticommandeering principle may 
in fact be weak, 130 particularly as applied to commandeering of 
executive officials, 131 but the practice of attaching federalism 
understandings to human rights treaties does not strengthen 
the case against the principle. First, this practice is too recent 
to have any value ·as evidence of the Framers' intent, or 
otherwise to receive deference because of its pedigree. Second, 
the accountability concerns that led the Court in New York and 
127. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The 
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346 (1995). 
128. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 970-76 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
129. Neuman, supra note 7, at 52 (footnote omitted). 
130. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 
106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1781-82 (1997). 
131. In addition to the articles by Professor Caminker already cited, see 
supra notes 20, 37, see, for example, Jackson, supra note 45; Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993); Martin 
Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?: Federal Power us. "States' Rights" in Foreign 
Affairs, 70 U.COLO. L. REV. 1277 (1999). But see Hills, supra note 49, at 831-55. 
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Printz to prohibit the federal government from commandeering 
state legislatures seem equally relevant in the treaty context. 
Treaty adherence offers certain benefits under international 
law. Indeed, the federal government maintains that its 
purpose in adhering to human rights treaties is not to produce 
any changes domestically, so much as to attain international 
standing to complain of other nations' violations.132 If the 
federalism understanding imposes on the states the duty to 
pass the laws the treaty contemplates, it permits the federal 
government to reap the international benefits while shunting 
to the states the domestic political costs.133 If the federal 
government through treaty makes an international 
undertaking on the part of the Untied States, it seems only 
right that any legislative action required by the treaty-and 
any political heat that results-be taken by the federal 
government. 
Perhaps the federalism understanding can be saved from a 
challenge based on the New York and Printz cases on the 
ground that, unlike the obligation imposed on state executive 
officials by the Brady Act or the obligation imposed on state 
legislatures by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Amendments 
Act, the states' obligation to pass legislation to implement 
these human rights treaties is not backed by any sanction for 
noncompliance. If this argument were accepted, though, it 
would be because the absence of a sanction renders the 
domestic law "duty" to pass legislation effectively precatory. 
This may in fact be the intent behind the federalism 
understanding, which would explain why the understanding is 
widely regarded as benefiting rather than burdening the 
states. 134 But if the purpose of this understanding is to make 
132. See David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and 
Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1993). Such a purpose is neither 
unusual nor objectionable. It is generally the case that nations undertake 
international obligations through treaty only because of the benefits they stand to 
gain from the reciprocal undertakings of the other states-parties. What would be 
objectionable would be the failure to take seriously the obligations undertaken in 
exchange for those taken on by one's treaty partners. 
133. This dynamic was evident in another aspect of the Breard episode. See 
Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power, supra note 4, at 690. 
134. Alternatively, the federalism understanding, though imposing a 
mandatory obligation on the states to pass legislation, might be regarded as 
preferable to the states than outright federal preemption because at least it leaves 
to the states some discretion as to the particular form the required legislation will 
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compliance with these treaties ultimately a matter of the 
states' option, then the resulting regime is in deep tension with 
our constitutional scheme. The Founders made treaties the 
law of the land because they valued treaty compliance and they 
understood that if compliance were left to the individual states, 
as it was under the Articles of Confederation, then compliance 
would be haphazard at best. If the treaties containing the 
federalism understandings do not violate the commandeering 
prohibition because they do not command, but merely request, 
action on the part of the states, then for that very reason the 
understandings are highly problematic. As a matter of 
international law, the treaties impose obligations; they do not 
just make requests. 
In any event, it is far from clear that the absence of a 
sanction would save the understanding. The Court has not 
elaborated the distinction between laws that commandeer and 
laws that merely request cooperation. Although the presence 
of a sanction clearly places a statute in the former category, 135 
it does not follow that the absence of one places a statute in the 
latter. To hold that it does would reflect a rather unflattering 
opinion of the characters of state executive and legislative 
officers, an opinion that seems uncharacteristic of the Justices 
in the majority in recent federalism decisions. If the Court 
instead regards as noncommandeering only statutes that 
expressly state that the contemplated conduct is optional, then 
the federalism understandings would appear to be invalid.136 
It may seem ironic that a doctrine designed to protect the 
states' sovereignty results in the invalidation of a provision 
apparently designed for their benefit, but this sort of irony 
take. This, however, would not distinguish the federal obligation imposed by 
these treaties from that imposed by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Amendments Act, which likewise left the states with much discretion. 
135. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
136. The absence of a sanction would certainly reduce the likelihood that a 
state would ever seek a judicial declaration that it is not required to enact the 
legislation. If it did obtain such a declaration, moreover, the end result would be 
the same as the result the understanding seeks to produce, as neither the states 
nor any individual would be able to maintain an action in the courts to require the 
federal government to enact the required legislation. See supra note 124. For this 
reason, the understanding's incompatibility with New York's anticommandeering 
principle may be relevant only to a conscientious president or senator-{)ne who 
takes seriously constitutional limitations on the treaty power without regard to 
their possible enforcement by the courts. This is not the same, however, as saying 
that the conflict is irrelevant (at least one hopes). 
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pervades the anticommandeering doctrine. As Justice Breyer 
noted in his dissenting opinion in Printz, the federal 
government's inability to commandeer may paradoxically 
result in the creation of an unwieldy federal bureaucracy more 
threatening to the states.137 Indeed, the conditional 
preemption doctrine itself reflects the irony that the federal 
government retains powers far more threatening to states than 
that of commandeering their officials. It is noteworthy in this 
connection that the Founders gave the federal government the 
power to commandeer the state courts to enforce federal law 
because those concerned with protecting state sovereignty 
viewed this option as less threatening to the states than the 
creation of a battery of federal trial courts to enforce federal 
laws throughout the nation.138 On the other hand, those who 
objected to commandeering of state officials were animated by 
a profound distrust of state officials' willingness and ability to 
enforce federal law faithfully. 139 This history may call into 
question the correctness of the holdings in New York and 
Printz/40 but it also suggests that, as long as those decisions 
stand, we should not be surprised that it operates to invalidate 
some provisions regarded as desirable by defenders of state 
interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the anticommandeering principle articulated in 
New York ·and Printz applies to exercises of the treaty power 
137. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
138. The principal disagreement at the Convention concerning the federal 
courts was between the nationalists, who wanted to create lower federal courts to 
enforce federal law, and the defenders of states' rights, who wanted to rely on the 
state courts to enforce federal laws, subject to Supreme Court review-in essence 
a species of commandeering. Under the Madisonian Compromise, Congress was 
given the power, but not the duty, to create lower federal courts, and state judges 
were instructed in the Supremacy Clause to enforce federal laws. See generally 
RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 7-9 (4th ed. 1996). Thus, the current system, which relies on 
federal commandeering of state judges, reflects the victory on this point of the 
defenders of states' interests over the nationalists. 
139. See Hills, supra note 49, at 818. 
140. But cf id. at 855-916 (defending anticommandeering principle on 
functional grounds while acknowledging that the historical support for the 
principle reflected nationalist sentiment). 
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depends on the scope of that principle. If those decisions 
invalidate federal laws that affect states "in their role as 
governments" or that impose obligations on states without 
imposing them on private parties, their holdings cannot be 
applicable to treaties. Such a rule would invalidate the typical 
treaty, including some that have been upheld by the Supreme 
Court. On the other hand, a narrower interpretation of the 
anticommandeering principle-one that, for example, 
invalidates laws placing affirmative but not negative 
obligations, or laws that impose obligations on the states' 
governmental activities without placing similar obligations on 
the federal government-could unproblematically be applied to 
exercises of the treaty power, as long as the Court continued to 
recognize a broad power of conditional preemption. Treaties 
that impose affirmative obligations on states in connection with 
functions or activities they are already undertaking could then 
be upheld as giving the states a choice between complying with 
the obligation and withdrawing from the activity. As long as 
Missouri v. Holland remains good law, the federal 
government's power to impose that choice on the states will be 
virtually plenary. Whether the broad or narrow understanding 
of the anticommandeering principle were adopted, the Vienna 
Convention's consular notification provision would be valid, as 
would any treaty placing obligations on states in connection 
with functions they undertake as governments.141 
141. If the broad understanding were adopted, the Vienna Convention would 
be valid because Printz would not be applicable to the treaty power. If the narrow 
interpretation were adopted, the Vienna Convention would be valid as conditional 
preemption. 
